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courts of appeal to meet before modifying an award of the trial court, but
since the judge or jury is in the better position to evaluate actual damages,
this is the better standard.
Ernest L. Nix, Jr.
THE POST-KA7Z PROBLEM OF
WHEN "LOOKING" WILL CONSTITUTE SEARCHING
VIOLATIVE OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Several days after receiving a phone call from defendant Fearn's
neighbor concerning his observation of some strange looking plants in
Fearn's back yard, the police went to the neighbor's home to determine
what the plants were. A deputy testified that he could identify the plants as
marijuana while standing on the neighbor's property. After arresting the
defendant, the deputy went to the back yard and seized the plants. The trial
court granted the defendant's motion to suppress the plants as having been
unconstitutionally seized. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed and
held that the fourth amendment guarantee' against unreasonable seizures
was violated since the plants were in an area in which the defendant had a
reasonable expectation of privacy and that their warrantless seizure could
not be justified by any exception. State v. Fearn, 345 So. 2d 468 (La.
1977).
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees
that individuals shall "be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures. "2 Many courts used
1. The court cited the "right to privacy" in article I, section 5 of the Louisiana
Constitution of 1974 as a basis for its decision, but based its arguments solely on the
United States Constitution. State v. Fearn, 345 So. 2d 468, 469 (La. 1977). Art. I, § 5
provides:
Every person shall be secure in his person, property, communications,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches, seizures, or inva-
sions of privacy. No warrant shall issue without probable cause supported by
oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, the
persons or things to be seized, and the lawful purpose or reason for the search.
Any person adversely affected by a search or seizure conducted in violation of
this section shall have standing to raise its illegality in the appropriate court.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
1978]
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the concept of curtilage to broaden the scope of these specific guarantees,
and to protect a defendant against warrantless searches and seizures within
the boundaries of his property. 3 In the landmark decision of Katz v. United
States,4 the Supreme Court rejected the curtilage concept and supplied a
new standard for determining when the fourth amendment was violated.5
Reasoning that the fourth amendment protects people and not places, the
Court determined that the scope of protection depends upon the defend-
ant's "reasonable expectation of privacy," irrespective of his wherea-
bouts. 6
The new test increased an individual's protection in some situations
by no longer requiring a physical trespass as an essential element of a
search. 7 But in other cases, protection was reduced since an object within
the individual's curtilage was no longer automatically protected.' Thus
"what a person knowingly exposes to the public even in his own home or
office, is not a subject of fourth amendment protection. But what he seeks
to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be
constitutionally protected. " 9
However, not all searches and seizures in areas where the defendant
has a reasonable expectation of privacy violate the fourth amendment.
Since the fourth amendment proscribes only unreasonable searches and
seizures, some invasions of privacy, such as those authorized by a warrant
based on probable cause, are not prohibited. Conversely, the Supreme
Court has said that searches conducted outside the judicial process are per
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
3. Places which have been found to be within the range of curtilage are a barn,
Russell v. State, 37 Okla. Crim. 71, 256 P. 758 (1927), a hen house, People v. Lind,
370 III. 131, 18 N.E.2d 189 (1938), and a shed, Marshall v. Wheeler, 124 Me. 324,
128 A. 692 (1925). This concept did not extend to "open fields," however, even
though the field was lawfully in the defendant's possession. Hester v. United
States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924).
4. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
5. In Katz, the government had attached an electronic listening device to a
public phone booth where the defendant made his calls. Id. at 348.
6. Id. at 351.
7. Id. at 353.
8. United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42 (1976) (holding the doorway of a
private home a public place for fourth amendment purposes, where the police may
conduct a warrantless arrest based upon probable cause).
9. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
se unreasonable, with a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions.' 0
Katz also left lower courts with the problem of analyzing a "look-
ing" into a suspect's property from outside the premises. In United States
v. McMillon, 11 an officer, acting on information from an informant,
secured a vantage point on a porch in an adjacent yard with the owner's
consent to observe marijuana plants in the defendant's back yard. 12 Based
on his observations, he secured a warrant and seized the plants. Since the
seizure was authorized by a warrant, the sole issue was whether the initial
view was a search, and if so, whether it was reasonable although made
without prior judicial authorization. Although the federal district court
found that the yard was an area where the defendant had a reasonable
expectation of privacy, it concluded that "[t]his course of events could
hardly be construed as unreasonable conduct in the performance of police
duties, and indeed indicates a good faith effort by the police to comply
with the requirements of the law. "13 Similarly, the Texas Court of Crimi-
nal Appeals in George v. State 4 decided that officers were not required to
get a warrant to look through fence cracks to observe marijuana plants in a
constitutionally protected area. 15 However, in People v. Fly,' 6 an officer
who squeezed into a narrow area between a neighbor's garage and the
defendant's fence to reach his vantage point, which was almost blocked by
heavy foliage, was found by the California appellate court to have
conducted an illegal search by looking without prior judicial approval. 17
Evidence seized during execution of a search warrant based on the offi-
cer's observations was inadmissible because the view from the neighbor's
yard was "from a vantage point as to which the defendant had a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy."' 8
In the instant case the court categorized Fearn's expectation of priva-
10. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 453-55 (1971); Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
11. 350 F. Supp. 593 (D.D.C. 1972).
12. Id. at 596.
13. Id. at 597.
14. 509 S.W.2d 347 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
15. Id. at 348.
16. 34 Cal. App. 3d 665, 110 Cal. Rptr. 158 (Ct. App. 1973).
17. This holding is significant because the court had the opportunity to rest its
decision on more traditional grounds-the legality of the use of a telescope on a
second occasion prior to the seizure-but chose to. delineate the limits of visual




cy as reasonable although not fully justified. 19 Thus, the warrantless
seizure had to be justified by a special exception to the fourth amendment.
The prosecution tried to justify the seizure by invoking "plain
view," a doctrine which has caused far more confusion than clarity in
fourth amendment cases. As expounded by the United States Supreme
Court in Coolidge v. New Hampshire,20 plain view can justify a warrant-
less seizure only if a lawful search is in progress and the police inadver-
tently come upon evidence. 2' Thus an important justification for the
warrantless seizure is that no real privacy interest is involved since the
individual's privacy has already been invaded by the prior justified intru-
sion. 22 The Louisiana Supreme Court decided that these elements, a prior
justification for the original intrusion and an inadvertent discovery of
evidence, were not present in Fearn.23 The neighbor's permission to view
the plants from his yard was not a prior valid intrusion because the court
found that the only intrusion in this case occurred after the defendant was
arrested. Because the discovery was the result of a phone call requesting
inspection, it was not found to be inadvertent.
Furthermore, applying the principle in Coolidge that "no amount of
probable cause can justify a warrantless search or seizure absent exigent
circumstances," 24 the Louisiana court held that a plain view sighting of
evidence alone could never justify a warrantless seizure.25 Absent some
further justification, the officers could not seize the contraband, even if
they could look at it without trespassing. Even though what they saw could
establish probable cause, that probable cause alone could not allow en-
trance into a protected area to effectuate a seizure. 26 Since all justices
seemed to agree that the plain view doctrine did not apply, 27 one may
19. 345 So. 2d at 470. The plants were growing in a ditch among high weeds.
Although some plants were visible only on close inspection, others were visible
from the neighbor's house and could be identified without entering the defendant's
property. The court noted that the plants could not be seen from a public street but
in his dissent, Chief Justice Sanders stated that "one could position himself on the
street to see that portion of the yard where the marijuana grew." Id. at 472.
20. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
21. Id. at 466-68.
22. Id. at 466-67.
23. 345 So. 2d at 470.
24. 403 U.S. at 468.
25. 345 So. 2d at 471.
26. However, if the court found no reasonable expectation of privacy, and the
area was thereby unprotected, a warrantless seizure would be permissible,
constituting no intrusion under Katz. State v. Nine, 315 So. 2d 667, 671-72 (La.
1975).
27. In the dissenting opinions, no allegation was made that the plain view
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assume that the distinction between "plain view" looking and "plain
view" seizing will be maintained in Louisiana, and that the elements
necessary for the doctrine to apply will be strictly construed.
The failure to obtain a warrant after the initial view but prior to the
seizure enabled the court to avoid deciding whether the initial view of the
plants was a search which required a warrant. 28 The opinion did indicate,
however, that the seizure would have been justified if the officer had
secured a warrant after the view and before the seizure. The court stated
that "the intrusion into the protected area did not take place until after the
defendant was arrested,''29 thus implying that the only invasion of the
defendant's privacy was the warrantless entry and seizure. Moreover, by
stating that the "initial view was made at a time when the police could
have obtained a warrant,"30 the court implied that the police had probable
cause and that any subsequent warrant based on that probable cause would
not be tainted by the viewing. The court rejected the prosecution's argu-
ment that the seizure was lawful as incident to the defendant's arrest, not
on the ground that probable cause was lacking, but because the plants were
not in the defendant's immediate control. 31 The court seemingly
concluded that the deputy's view, although intruding into an area where
the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy, did not constitute a
search.
However, an argument can be made for classifying a planned "look-
ing" by police into an area where a defendant has a reasonable expectation
of privacy as a search. Such a classification comports with the spirit of
Katz and with. the word's common usage. However, such an intrusion
should be deemed reasonable when made in certain circumstances even
without a warrant. In determining when a viewing is reasonable, the court
should balance the state's interest in not having to obtain a warrant
whenever a policeman is asked to look at something against the privacy
interest of the individual. Where the intrusion is limited and reasonable, as
where there are no gymnastic feats or extensive trespass, the state's
interest in law enforcement outweighs the individual's interest in such a
limited invasion of privacy.32 However, if the intrusion becomes more
doctrine was not dealt with properly in the majority opinion. In fact, the doctrine
was not mentioned at all. 345 So. 2d at 472-74.
28. Id. at 471-72. The court simply held that the seizure without a warrant was
illegal since it could not be justified by any of the special exceptions.
29. Id. at 470.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Courts often undertake such a balancing process in determining when the
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extensive, as, for example, if artificial sensory devices are employed or a
physical trespass occurs, the individual's interest should prevail, and a
warrant should be necessary.
Applying the balancing test to the situation in Fearn, the warrantless
looking, even though a search, may be justified whereas the warrantless
seizure is not reasonable because it is a greater intrusion. Even if the
search had been more intrusive-if, for example, the deputy had trespass-
ed to obtain his view 3 -the search here might still have been reasonable
since the yard was unfenced and the police did not trespass into the area
where there was actually a reasonable expectation of privacy. Additional-
ly, the plants were not well enough hidden by the defendant to preclude
their observation from the neighbor's property. However, had the officer
entered the area around the shed where the weeds partially hid the plants or
had the plants not been visible from the neighbor's premises, it is suggest-
ed that such a trespass would constitute an unreasonable warrantless
search.
Similarly, the use of extra-sensory means of probing increases the
extent of intrusion and the likelihood that a court will consider a search
unreasonable. In Fearn, the officer made his observation with the unaided
eye. While it may not be unreasonable for officers standing on adjacent
property to use ordinary means to look at what is plainly visible, it could
be unreasonable to use binoculars or to fly over the yard in a helicopter. In
Katz, where the defendant was preserving his privacy from the uninvited
ear, a bugging device on a public phone constituted an unreasonable
invasion.34 Yet the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Fisch35 upheld the
admissibility of conversations overheard by state agents who were in an
adjoining motel room listening to the defendants without the use of
fourth amendment has been violated. United States v. Fisch, 474 F.2d 1071, 1078
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 921 (1973). The Supreme Court has also struck a
balance in the "stop and frisk" area by concluding that "there must be a narrowly
drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the
police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and
dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest .... "
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1967). The Supreme Court has enunciated a different
rule concerning a warrantless search of an automobile for purposes of law enforce-
ment efficacy, based upon the fact that a "vehicle can be quickly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought." Chimel v. California,
395 U.S. 752, 764 (1969).
33. Indeed, there is some indication that the officer did in fact cross the
property line. The deputy stated that "he affirmatively identified the suspect plants
before he crossed the property line." 345 So. 2d at 469.
34. 389 U.S. at 352-53.
35. 474 F.2d 1071 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 921 (1973).
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electronic equipment.36 No violation of privacy was found in view of the
non-trespassory origin of the information received and the absence of
artificial means of probing. Had an electronic device been used, the scales
might have been tipped in the defendant's favor because of the increased
extent of the intrusion.
If there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in an area, then a
warrantless search or seizure is permissible. Thus the extremely liberal
definition of reasonable expectations of privacy in Fearn is of great
significance. The plants in Fearn's yard were in an area where he had a
reasonable expectation of privacy even though they were visible to his
neighbor. 37 This finding contrasts sharply with many other state decisions
in which, once the plants were found to be in plain sight of an officer,
warrantless seizures were allowed, visibility cancelling any reasonable
expectations of privacy.38 In an earlier Louisiana case, State v. Nine ,39 the
court found no reasonable expectation of privacy in an enclosed side yard
used as an entry. 4' Whether the "reasonable although not justified"
rationale of Fearn is to be used in the future is debatable since the majority
opinion rests on the narrowest of margins. Both Chief Justice Sanders and
Justice Marcus found no reasonable expectation of privacy .41 Justice
Summers also dissented, and although Justice Dennis concurred, he found
the evidence conflicting.4 2
Although the court has laid some significant groundwork here in
36. Id. at 1076-78.
37. 345 So. 2d at 470.
38. For instance, the Supreme Court of California upheld a warrantless seizure,
deciding that a fenced yard was not constitutionally protected, even though the
plants were partially covered by foliage and could not be identified except from a
foot away. People v. Bradley, I Cal. 3d 80, 460 P.2d 129, 81 Cal. Rptr. 457 (1969).
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Nevada held the seizure of marijuana from the
defendant's yard legal since the plants were open to public view. Wallace v. State,
84 Nev. 532, 533, 445 P.2d 29, 29-30 (1968). And the Supreme Court of Colorado
held that driving up a driveway to obtain a view of plants in the picture window of
defendant's house located 100 to 150 yards off the street did not constitute a search
since the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his picture
window. People v. McGahey, 179 Colo. 401, 404-405, 500 P.2d 977, 978-79 (1972).
39. 315 So. 2d 667 (La. 1975).
40. Id. at 672. The facts were somewhat extreme in Nine, however: marijuana
was thrown out the window of the house while officers were present at the front
door looking for runaway juveniles believed to be inside. A person could not
reasonably expect to preserve his privacy and at the same time throw marijuana
from the window.
41. 345 So. 2d at 472-73 (Sanders, C.J., dissenting), 473-74 (Marcus, J., dis-
senting).
42. Id. at 472 (Dennis, J., concurring).
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determining when reasonable expectations exist and in explaining the plain
view doctrine, the dimensions of permissible search and seizure in
Louisiana after Katz remain somewhat undefined. The "right to privacy"
enshrined in article I, section 5 of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution43 and
cited, but not discussed, by the court as a basis for its decision, ' is yet
another factor to be considered in structuring the protection to be given
Louisiana citizens against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Susan Ann Swanner
MATRIMONIAL REGIME REFORM-A CONSTITUTIONAL NECESSITY
Incarcerated as a result of state criminal charges brought against him
by his wife, and in need of security for his debt incurred in order to pay
attorney's fees, a husband executed a mortgage on the family home, a
community asset with title in the name of both spouses. Learning of the
mortgage only upon institution of foreclosure proceedings following de-
fault, the wife claimed that the Louisiana provision allowing a husband to
mortgage the family home without the wife's consent was unconstitutional
as a violation of the equal protection clause and a denial of due process.
The federal district court held that due to the contractual nature of
Louisiana's matrimonial regime system, there was no violation of the
United States Constitution. Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 430 F. Supp. 642
(E.D. La. 1977).
Within the last few years, statutory provisions outlining different
standards for males and females have been subjected to careful con-
sideration by the United States Supreme Court to determine whether they
deny the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection.' Although the Court
has not yet directed its attention to the management provisions of any
state's community property system, Louisiana's designation of the hus-
band as the head and master, or manager and controller, of the community
of gains, 2 could become a prime candidate for equal protection analysis.
43. See note I, supra.
44. 345 So. 2d at 469.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 3 provides: "No state shall ... deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws .... "
2. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2404: "The husband is the head and master of the
[Vol. 38
